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An explosion of a lithium-thionyl-chloride (Li-SOCl2) battery during 
production (assembly) lead to serious worker injury.  The accident cell batch 
had been in a dry-air intermediate storage room for months before being 
readied with thionyl chloride electrolyte.  Metallic lithium can react with 
atmospheric nitrogen to produce lithium nitride.  Nodules of lithium nitride 
(Li3N) were found to be present on the lithium foil in other cells of the accident 
batch.  The investigation attributed the explosion to the formation of porous 
lithium nitride during intermediate storage and a violent exothermal 
decomposition with the SOCl2-LiAlCl4 electrolyte triggered by welding.  The 
literature is silent on hazards of explosion of Li-SOCl2 cells associated with the 
presence of lithium nitride.  The silence is intriguing.  Possible causes may be 
that such explosions are very rare, that explosions go unpublished precisely as 
this case initially did, or a combination of the two.   
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1.1 Lithium batteries 
Primary lithium batteries present a range of technical advantages such as high 
energy density, long shelf life, excellent discharge characteristics and 
functional tolerance for temperature extremes.  The lithium thionyl chloride 
(Li-SOCl2) system is the most important system with a fluid cathodic substance 
and offers an outstanding practical energy density and specific energy at 
especially high loadability [1], [2].   
The Li-SOCl2 system also presents safety concerns however.  The chemical 
reactivity, corrosiveness and toxic nature of the materials of construction have 
occasionally led to accidents at the manufacturing facility [3].  In case of 
battery abuse (e.g. short circuit) users may experience problems with thermal 
runaway, venting of toxic gasses or explosion, which in extreme cases have led 
to accidents with serious injury or fatal outcome [4], [5], [6]. 
The accident battery was a so-called bobbin low rate construction where a foil 
of lithium metal is pressed onto the inside wall of the steel container.  In this 
battery construction, the relatively low lithium surface area limits the rate of 
excess heat generated and simplifies thermal management (overheat protection) 
issues.  The type is considered safer than so-called high rate cells, which have 
spirally wound lithium foil electrodes and hence a larger surface area. 
1.2 Battery details 
The accident cell was a R14 stainless steel (type 304) container with metallic 
lithium foil as anode, thionyl chloride as cathode, compressed powdered carbon 
and nickel mesh as current collector and a glass fibre nonwoven separator 
(Figure 1).  The lithium foil thickness was 1.4 mm.  The electrolyte was 
prepared adding AlCl3 and LiCl salts to anhydrous SOCl2 to yield a solution of 
1.73M LiAlCl4, about 300 g/l.  Henceforth, the article will refer to this solution 
as the thionyl chloride electrolyte, or simply the electrolyte. 
Production took place in two steps.  After assembly of the major components, 
cells were kept for some time in a dry-air (<1% relative humidity) room for 
intermediate storage.  Cells were then readied with thionyl chloride electrolyte, 
sealed, and completed with electrode terminals etc.   





Figure 1 Schematic construction of accident R14 cell 
 
1.3 Explosion 
The anode terminal, a nickel strip, was welded to the side of the steel container.  
The point of attachment was near the upper edge of the metallic lithium foil 
inside the container.  Eye protection was worn because of potential welding 
sparks.  The manual work operation was otherwise considered unhazardous.   
At the day of the accident, a cell suddenly exploded during welding.  The 
explosion was so forceful that the assembly worker lost a finger.   





2.1 Examination of accident production batch 
The accident cell was part of a production batch that had been kept in dry-air 
intermediate storage for about 11 months, an unusually long time.   
Examination of other cells of the accident production batch revealed the 
presence of nodules of crystals on the lithium foil ranging in colour from black 
to brown-red.  
The nodules were cone shaped and appeared to have originated from a small 
contact area at the glass fibre separator and expanded as they grew into and 
sometimes through the lithium foil.  In cases with full penetration of the foil, 
the nodule area could reach 0.5-2.5 cm2.  Auger electron spectroscopy analysis 
of nodule material identified a mixture of lithium oxide (Li2O) and lithium 
nitride (Li3N) or lithium oxynitride (LiNO).  Nodule material extracted from 
two batteries weighed 175 mg and 415 mg, respectively. 
Nodule material wetted with thionyl chloride electrolyte was clearly unstable 
and could be brought to explode when scratched with a pair of tweezers.  The 
explosion of 20 mg of nodule material gave a discernible pressure wave in a 40 
litres glove box.  Explosion could also be triggered when heated to 400 °C with 
a soldering iron.  Unwetted nodule material was generally stable.  Because of 
these findings, the investigation focussed on the reactivity of the wetted nodule 
material.  
2.2 Likely explosion mechanism 
Metallic lithium reacts slowly with atmospheric nitrogen to produce lithium 
nitride.  The accident investigation committee concluded that unusually large 
amounts of Li3N had formed during the extended intermediate storage.  The 
working hypothesis was that lithium nitride wetted with electrolyte was 
unstable and that welding had triggered an explosion. 
In an attempt to reproduce the explosion, the welding procedure was repeated 
on cells from the same production batch and electrolyte batch as the accident 
cell (”sister cells”).  Quite surprisingly, welding on 2,579 “sister cells” failed to 
produce a single explosion however.  




Nonetheless, the accident investigation committee eventually concluded that 
Li3N was the most plausible candidate responsible for the explosion.  As 
described below, no other more plausible mechanism could be identified.   
2.3 No production irregularities identified 
All production journals were examined and no irregularities were identified.  
Infrared spectroscopy analysis of the electrolyte of two accident production 
batch cells ("sister cells") showed slightly elevated water contents but still 
within the normal range.  The concentrations of sulphur dioxide (SO₂) and 
dichlorine monoxide (Cl2O) were minimal.  No contamination or other 
anomalies were identified.  The electrolyte was normal.   
2.4 The welding process 
The plasma welding equipment was examined and found without fault.  The 
ability of a stray welding current to affect the electrochemical system was 
considered unlikely.  The welding energy was low, typically about 50 J and the 
electric current would flow mainly in the steel container, not in the metallic 
lithium foil, in part because of the narrow distance between the welding 
electrodes.   
Heat impact was considered possible however.  Calculations showed that 
during welding, the temperature on the inside of an empty steel container could 
reach about 450 °C for some 10-20 milliseconds.  While the temperature 
increase would be lower in a filled steel container, it was considered plausible 
that it could trigger an explosion of unstable nodule material. 
2.5 Heating and short circuit tests 
Two "sister cells" were heated in a silicone oil bath.  The first cell showed a 
weak exothermic reaction at 120-140 °C and an expected plateau at 180 °C, the 
melting point of metallic lithium.  The cell exploded at 250 °C, like normal 
reference cells could do.  The second cell lost voltage at 250 °C when the glass 
feed-through failed and the electrolyte evaporated.  The test was terminated at 
300 °C without explosion. 
During the normal weld procedure the plasma welding electrodes are not near 
the positive pole of the cell and a short circuit caused by the welding equipment 
was considered unlikely.  Still, five test were carried out on "sister cells" that 
were thermally insulated in mineral wool and then short circuited.  Maximum 
recorded temperatures were 145, 88, 170, 175 and 170 °C.  In four cells, the 
glass feed-through failed.  None of the cells exploded. 
2.6 Crush tests 
Crush tests were carried out with a 5.7 kg iron cylinder dropped from a height 
of 4 m.  “Sister cells” generally exploded upon crushing impact.  Reference 




cells taken from other production batches did not explode when subjected to 
this test.  Explosion of reference cells could occasionally be observed at a 
second crush impact attempt, when the crushed cell had been exposed to moist 
air for several minutes. 
 





3.1 Experimental evidence for an exothermic reaction 
involving Li3N 
Dallek et al. [7] carried out differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) 
measurements on various components of Li-SOC12 cells to identify those 
combinations that react exothermically and might cause batteries to explode.  
The study reported that Li3N undergoes violent exotherms with SOCl2  at 196 
°C and with the SOCl2-LiAlCl4 system at 132 °C.   
Differential thermal analysis (DTA) measurements carried out by the company 
on Li3N nodule material were unable to reproduce the results reported by 
Dallek et al. however.  
3.2 Porous Li3N hypothesis 
Upon reaction with atmospheric nitrogen and lithium metal, crystals of reddish 
brown lithium nitride are known to extend into the interior of the metal over 
time [8].   
The accident investigation committee theorized that because the specific 
density of lithium nitride (1.38) is considerably larger than that of lithium metal 
(0.53) the porosity of the formed nodules of nitride crystals would allow 
diffusion of nitrogen to freshly exposed metal, thereby sustaining continued 
reaction and growth of the nodule.  The porosity would also provide a large 
surface area for the reaction between Li3N and SOCl2.   
Indeed, we argue that a large contact area is a precondition for an explosive 
reaction to take place between a solid and a liquid substance.  
Porosity issues might also explain why verification trials carried out by the 
company could not reproduce the exotherms reported by Dallek et al. [7].  They 
had used commercially available finely divided Li3N powder, which may have 
had a larger surface area than the Li3N nodule material extracted from the 
lithium foil of "sister cells".   




3.3 Tetrasulfur tetranitride trigger hypothesis 
The accident investigation committee briefly theorized that lithium nitride 
might react with trace amounts of water to produce ammonia and lithium 
hydroxide.  The ammonia might then react with thionyl chloride to produce 
tetrasulfur tetranitride (S4N4), which is sensitive to heat and shock and 
decomposes explosively.   
Welding may therefore have triggered explosive decomposition of S4N4, which 
in turn triggered the reaction between Li3N and SOCl2.  The formation of shock 
sensitive S4N4 might also explain why cells exploded in the second crush 
impact test attempt after having been exposed to moist air for several minutes.   
The literature on this topic appears extremely sparse.  We have only identified a 
single source [6] on observed shock sensitivity of Li- SOCl2 cells, and it makes 
passing mention only. 
3.4 Literature silent on lithium nitride explosion hazards 
Preliminary findings were shared with two other lithium battery makers.  For a 
number of trivial reasons however, the case was never communicated to a 
wider audience. 
We have been unable to identify any literature that mentions the risk of 
explosion of Li-SOCl2 cells associated with the formation of lithium nitride.  A 
recent review article [9] and a recent book [10] are silent on the issue.  Standard 
reference works on chemical incompatibilities [11], [12] do not list violent 
exotherms with Li3N and the SOCl2-LiAlCl4 system.   
The silence is intriguing.  Possible causes may be that such explosions are very 
rare, that explosions go unpublished precisely as this case did, or a combination 
of the two.   





Although the exact cause could not be determined with certainty, it was 
concluded that the most likely cause was that highly porous nodules of lithium 
nitride wetted with thionyl chloride were present on the inside of the accident 
battery container near the point of welding.  Welding had heated and triggered 
an exothermal reaction with lithium nitride and the electrolyte.   
Practical prevention of recurrence would therefore rely on the ability to keep 
the formation of unwanted lithium nitride in check.  Hence, the maximum 
duration of dry-air intermediate storage of semi-finished batteries was limited 
to one week.  In addition, the production process was modified so welding of 
the nickel strip was carried out before the electrolyte filling step. 
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